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Abstract 
 
Knowledge requires more than a true belief. In order to know something one must 
not only believe the truth, rather one’s belief has to be related to its truth in a 
certain way. One of the principal aims of epistemology, the study of knowledge, is 
to explain what that ‘certain way’ is. This dissertation examines the idea that 
knowledge requires a certain modal connection to truth. Such a connection is 
expressed with a condition that includes modal notions, like ‘would’, ‘must’, 
‘could’, ‘might’ etc. Modal notions refer not to how things are, but to how things 
could have been, should be, must be, or would be. Modalized epistemology is 
epistemology that seeks to solve epistemological problems with the help of modal 
notions. The motivation for modalized epistemology stems from the fact that 
many concepts that have a central place in epistemology seem to be modal in 
nature. ‘Reliability’, ‘luck’, ‘ability’ and ‘certainty’ are perhaps best explicated 
with the help of modalities. This thesis develops further an existing modal 
condition known as the safety condition and applies it to several epistemological 
problems. According to the safety condition in order to know it must be the case 
that one could not easily have erred. In Essay 1 a novel way of understanding the 
safety condition is offered and used to solve two perennial problems in 
epistemology. In Essay 2 modalized epistemology is applied to the problem of 
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peer disagreement. In Essay 3 it is argued that virtue-theoretic analyses of 
knowledge that are committed to the idea that in order to know one’s cognitive 
abilities have to contribute to one’s cognitive success are ultimately 
unsatisfactory, since the modal relation that they claim to hold between belief and 
its truth is too strong. The thesis contains also an introductory chapter that offers a 
brief historical background of the development of modalized epistemology and 
lays out the current debate as well as some problems that are left unanswered in 
the essays. 
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Abstrakti 
 
Tosi uskomus ei välttämättä ole tietoa. Jotta uskomus olisi tietoa, täytyy 
uskomuksen ja sen totuuden välillä vallita tietynlainen suhde. Yksi tieto-opin 
perimmäisistä kysymyksistä on mikä tuo suhde on. Tämä väitöskirja tutkii 
ajatusta, että kyseinen suhde on modaalinen luonteeltaan. Modaaliset käsitteet 
eivät viittaa siihen miten asiat ovat, vaan ne ilmaisevat miten asiat olisivat voineet 
olla, miten niiden tulisi olla, miten niiden täytyy olla, tai miten ne eivät voi olla. 
Modalisoitu tieto-oppi pyrkii ratkaisemaan tieto-opillisia ongelmia modaalisten 
käsitteiden avulla. Modalisoitu tieto-oppi vaikuttaa lupaavalta hankkeelta siksi, 
että monet keskeiset tieto-opin käsitteet vaikuttavat olevan modaalisia 
luonteeltaan. ”Luotettavuus”, ”riskialtius”, ”onnekkuus”, ”kyvykkyys”, ja 
”varmuus” ovat käsitteitä, jotka ovat ehkä parhaiten ymmärrettävissä modaalisten 
käsitteiden avulla. Tässä väitöskirjassa annetaan uusi tulkinta turvallisuusehtona 
tunnetusta modaalisesta tiedonehdosta, ja sovelletaan sitä erinäisiin tieto-opillisiin 
ongelmiin. Turvallisuusehdon mukaan tieto vaatii toden uskomuksen lisäksi sitä, 
ettei olisi voinut helposti erehtyä. Esseessä 1 esitetään uusi muotoilu 
turvallisuusehdosta ja sen avulla ratkaistaan kaksi vakavaa tieto-opillista 
ongelmaa. Esseessä 2 modalisoitua epistemologiaa sovelletaan 
vertaiserimielisyyden ongelmaan. Esseessä 3 argumentoidaan, että modaalinen 
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suhde, joka vallitsee uskomuksen ja sen totuuden välillä tiedon tapauksissa, ei voi 
olla niin vahva kuin jotkut hyve-tietoteoreetikot ovat taipuvaisia väittämään. 
Tähän väitöskirjaan sisältyy myös johdanto, jossa luodaan lyhyt katsaus 
modalisoidun tieto-opin historialliseen kehitykseen sekä nykyiseen keskusteluun, 
ja nostetaan esiin ongelmia, joita ei käsitellä esseissä.   
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Abstrakt 
 
En sann trosföreställning är inte nödvändigtvis kunskap. Det måste också finnas 
någonslags koppling mellan sanningen och trosföreställningen. En av 
kunskapsteorins centrala frågor är vad denna koppling består i. Den här 
avhandlingen undersöker idén att kunskap föruttsätter att vissa modala villkor 
uppfylls. Modala begrepp refererar inte till hur sakerna är, utom till hur sakerna 
kan vara, måste vara, inte kan vara eller borde vara. Modal kunskapsteori försöker 
lösa kunskapsteoretiska problem genom att utnyttja modala begrepp. Modal 
kunskapsteori motiveras av observationen att många centrala kunskapsteoretiska 
begrepp är av modalnatur. ”Reliabilitet” (eller "trovärdighet") ”risk”, ”tur” och 
”förmåga” kan kanske bäst förstås med hjälp av modaa begrepp. I denna 
avhandling ges en ny formulering av ett modalt kunskapsvillkor, som kallas 
säkerhetsvillkoret.  Detta villkor tillämpas i analysen av olika kunskapsteoretiska 
problem. Enligt säkerhetsvillkoret krävs för kunskap förutom en sann 
trosföreställining att man inte lätt kunde ha haft en falsk  trosföreställining. I den 
första essän ges en ny formulering av säkerhetsvillkoret och detta tillämpas på två 
centrala kunskapsteoretiska problem. I den andra essän tillämpas 
säkerhetsvillkoret på problemet gällande meningsskiljaktighet mellan jämlika 
personer. I den tredje essän hävdas att  dygdkunskapsteoretiska teorier förutsätter  
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en för stark modal koppling mellan trosförställiningar och deras sannohet. 
Avhandlingen har också ett kapitel som introducerar den modala kunskapsteorins 
historia och dagens debatt och lyftar fram några problem som inte är behandlas i 
de andra essäerna i avhandlingen. 
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Introduction 
 
Knowledge requires more than a true belief. In order to know something one must 
not only believe the truth, but one’s belief has to be related to its truth in an 
appropriate way. Otherwise a lucky guess would count as knowledge. One of the 
principal aims of epistemology, the study of knowledge, is to explain what the 
‘appropriate way’ is. Before Edmund Gettier’s groundbreaking article that 
transformed analytic epistemology, it was presumably widely thought that a belief 
is knowledge just in case it was true and justified.1 Gettier demonstrated, 
however, that the appropriate connection cannot consist in ‘justification’, at least 
if justification is taken to be a fallible. To see this consider a case offered by 
Russell (1948, pp. 170-171), where  a subject S looks at a clock that reads ‘12’ 
and forms the justified true belief that it is 12 o’clock. However, unbeknownst to 
S the clock stopped exactly 12 hours ago. S’s belief is justified because from S’s 
perspective she is consulting a clock that is in working order. Given the evidence 
that was available for S, any reasonable subject would have believed as S did. 
Intuitively, however, S does not know that it is 12 o’clock even though her belief 
is true and justified since it is only a matter of luck that the clock is showing the 
                                                     
1 It is debatable whether the view that knowledge is justified true belief was ever widely held 
among analytic epistemologists. Plantinga (1993, pp. 6-7), for example, writes “it isn’t easy to find 
many really explicit statements of [the justified true belief] analysis of knowledge prior to Gettier. 
It is almost as if a distinguished critic created a tradition in the very act of destroying it.” 
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correct time. Had S looked at the clock a bit earlier or a bit later her belief would 
have been false. 
The reason why Gettier cases are possible is because justification does not entail 
truth. Given that a justified belief might be false, it is always possible that a belief 
is justified and true, while the truth of the belief is simply a matter of good luck. 
In essence there is a ‘gap’ between justification and truth, and that gap might be 
bridged either in an appropriate way or in an inappropriate way. Linda Zagzebski 
(1994, p. 69) has given a recipe of how to generate Gettier cases: start with a 
justified belief that is false due to bad luck. Add an element of good luck so that 
the belief turns out to be true after all. Voilá! You have a justified true belief that 
is true due to good luck, and intuitively fails to be knowledge.  
Post-Gettier epistemology is littered with attempts to provide a fourth condition 
for knowledge, which together with belief, truth and justification would give the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and with proposals that seek to 
understand justification in such a way that it is not satisfied in Gettier cases. The 
former attempts have generally been deemed failures, not least because they were 
susceptible to counter examples, as Zagzebski noted, while the latter seem to 
mischaracterize the concept of justification altogether.  
Perhaps because of the failure to utilize the concept of justification in the analysis 
of knowledge, some epistemologists cleared the slate and began searching for a 
single condition that would capture the connection that must hold between belief 
and its truth in order for the belief to be knowledge. These attempts have 
generally been externalist in nature and have dispensed the idea that knowledge 
should be analysed even partially in terms of justification. A central feature of 
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these views is that they aim to eliminate the kind of luck that is at play in Gettier 
cases. The need to eliminate harmful epistemic luck gave rise to modalized 
epistemology. 
To see this, consider Alvin Goldman’s (1967) externalist causal account of 
knowledge that can be interpreted as lacking a modal dimension.2 On Goldman’s 
account one knows that p if and only if the fact that p is causally connected in an 
appropriate way to one’s belief that p (1967, p. 369). In order to evaluate whether 
a subject’s belief qualifies as knowledge all we need to do is to look at how the 
belief is connected to its truth in the actual world. Suppose now that I see an elm 
in front of me and thereby come to believe that there is an elm before me. On 
Goldman’s account I ought to know that there is an elm before me. But assume 
that I cannot discriminate elms from beeches, and that right next to the elm are 
several beeches. Intuitively I do not know that an elm is before me because I 
could very easily have looked at a beech, and still believed that it is an elm. In a 
sense my belief is true only as a matter of good luck. What this shows is that in 
order to eliminate knowledge-destroying epistemic luck it is not enough that the 
belief is actually tied to its truth via an appropriate causal link. Rather, the belief 
must retain an appropriate connection to its truth even if things had been slightly 
different. In essence, knowledge requires a certain modal connection between 
belief and truth. Epistemology that seeks to explicate how knowledge must be 
                                                     
2 Whether Goldman’s account has a modal dimension or not, depends on the nature of causation. If 
causal conditions are modal conditions, then Goldman’s account is modal in nature. (I am indebted 
to John Greco for bringing this to my attention.) Be that as it may, it is easy to see that the modal 
condition that might be included in Goldman’s causal account of knowledge is too weak. Goldman 
(1976) himself seems to have been aware of this, since he retracted from the causal account and 
offered a modal theory of perceptual knowledge in its place.  
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modally related to what is known is modalized epistemology as it is conceived 
here.3 
The first notable attempt to understand what knowledge is with the help of a 
modal condition was made by Fred Dretske (1971) and Robert Nozick (1981). 
Nozick’s formulation of the condition became much more popular, in fact so 
popular that quite a few seem to have forgotten that it was Dretske who first 
proposed the condition. The condition Nozick proposed came to be known as the 
‘sensitivity’ condition. According to the sensitivity condition a subject S’s belief 
that p is sensitive just in case if it were the case that not p, S would not believe 
that p (Nozick, 1981, p. 179).4 The condition can be presented more formally as 
follows with ‘?→’ standing for the subjunctive conditional: ¬p ?→ ¬B(p). This 
condition is modal in nature because it asks to consider whether S would believe 
that p if p were false.  
Modal conditions for knowledge are usually explicated with the help of a 
possible-worlds heuristic. In the possible worlds framework the space of possible 
worlds is centred on the actual world and branches out according to a similarity 
ordering. The actual world represents the world as it actually is.  Possible worlds 
represent scenarios that could have obtained. The worlds closest to the actual 
world are very similar to the actual world. The worlds that are further away are 
less similar to it. The worlds that are on the very rim of the space of possible 
worlds are utterly unlike our world and perhaps even impossible to conceive for 
creatures like us. 
                                                     
3 I borrow the term ‘modalized epistemology’ from Becker (2007). 
4 Different formulations of the sensitivity condition have been offered as a necessary condition for 
knowledge by DeRose (1995) Black (2002), Roush (2005), Becker (2007), Black and Murphy 
(2007), Cross (2010),  Zalabardo (2012), and Wallbridge (2016) among others. 
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The notion of ‘similarity’ is often taken as a primitive among those who utilize a 
possible-worlds framework. Lewis (1973), for example, took it as a primitive 
notion in his semantics for counterfactuals. However, if we do not attempt to 
elucidate the notion of similarity beyond an ‘intuitive’ way of understanding what 
it is, we invite the risk of smuggling the notion of knowledge into our 
understanding of what makes a world more or less similar. That is, if we do not 
clarify what similarity is, we might end up in ranking the possible worlds in a 
certain order solely by virtue of our intuition of whether the subject knows or does 
not know in the actual world. This presents a risk for our methodology. Hence a 
few words on what world-similarity is are in order here. 
A helpful way of conceiving world-similarity is in terms of change. World w is 
more similar to v than to u in case less change is needed to make w identical to v 
than to u. The world where I spill my coffee is closer to the actual world if my 
coffee cup is filled to the brim than it is if my coffee cup is half full. Sometimes 
the modal distance between worlds can be measured simply in terms of the 
amount of physical change that we would need to implement to one of the worlds 
in order for the other one to obtain. Often we need to consider other sorts of 
changes as well. Suppose that I have resolved never to drive while intoxicated and 
that it would be against my character to act against what I have resolved to do. 
The possible world where I drive while intoxicated in such a case is a faraway 
possible world, even though the amount of (purely) physical changes that we 
would have to implement for it to be the case that I drive while intoxicated is 
roughly the same as in the case when I am a frequent drunk-driver. In the latter 
case, the possible world where I drive while intoxicated is much closer to the 
actual world than in the former case. Intentions and the quality of the changes also 
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matter. Some changes have greater weight than others, and we might not be able 
to characterize those changes in a purely physical language. While these remarks 
are rather vague, I hope they give some conception of how world-similarity is 
understood here. 
Epistemologists who make use of possible worlds usually assume standard 
semantics for modal expressions. Thus a proposition is necessarily true if and only 
if it is true in all possible worlds and necessarily false if it is false in all possible 
worlds. A proposition is possibly true if true in at least one possible world and 
possibly false if false in at least one possible world. A proposition is contingently 
true if true in the actual world, but false in some possible world. Finally, a 
sentence that features a subjunctive conditional like “if p had been the case, then q 
would have been the case” is true if and only if q is true in the scope of the nearest 
possible worlds where p is true.5 At this point it is worth emphasizing that 
possible worlds as they are used in this context always refer to metaphysically 
possible worlds – worlds that could have obtained – not to epistemically possible 
worlds, worlds that are coherent from the perspective of a certain individual but 
not necessarily metaphysically possible. 
 
                                                     
5 Note that this interpretation of the subjunctive conditional differs from the standard interpretation 
offered by Lewis (1973). For Lewis a proposition p ?→ q is true just in case q is true in the 
nearest possible world where p is true. Since according to Lewis the actual world is always the 
nearest possible world p ?→ q will end up being true whenever p and q are true in the actual 
world. If we adopted this interpretation of the subjunctive conditional the safety condition would 
end up being vacuously true whenever the subject’s belief is true. Therefore we will follow Nozick 
(1981, p. 680, n. 8) and interpret the subjunctive conditional as stated above. 
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In this figure the actual world is denoted by ‘@’. The similarity of the worlds is 
presented as a distance between them. In the figure b, c, d, e, f, g and h represent 
worlds that are very similar to @. Worlds that are further away from @ are less 
similar to it, z representing the metaphysically possible world that is maximally 
dissimilar to @.  
In the possible worlds framework the sensitivity condition reads as follows: 
SENSITIVITY: A subject S’s belief that p is sensitive if and only if, 
i) in the nearest possible worlds where p is false, S does not believe that 
p. 
To evaluate whether a subject’s belief that p is sensitive we need to look at the 
nearest possible worlds where p is false and check whether the subject believes 
that p. If she does not believe that p then her belief is sensitive. At first glimpse 
SENSITIVITY seems like a very promising necessary condition for knowledge. It 
is not satisfied in Gettier cases like the stopped clock case because in the nearest 
possible worlds where it is not 12 o’clock S will continue to believe that it is, 
since the clock has stopped.  
But perhaps the main reason why epistemologists have been attracted to the 
sensitivity condition has to do with its anti-sceptical qualities. After all, many of 
our mundane beliefs are sensitive. My belief that I am typing at the moment is 
sensitive because in the nearest possible world where I am not typing I am playing 
the ukulele and I do not believe that I am typing. Possible worlds where sceptical 
hypotheses turn out to be true – such as the possible world where I am a brain in a 
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vat (BIV) that is electrochemically stimulated so that it seems to me that I am 
typing – do not threaten the sensitivity of my belief that I am typing, since such 
worlds are not among the closest worlds where I am not typing. Interestingly, 
SENSITIVITY can also accommodate the intuition that we do not know the 
denials of sceptical hypotheses. This is because in the nearest possible worlds 
where my belief that I am not a BIV is false (e.g. in worlds where I am a BIV) 
everything will seem to me as it seems to me in the actual world and hence I will 
believe that I am not a BIV. But in that case my belief is not sensitive and I cannot 
know that I am not a BIV. Therefore, it seems that proponents of SENSITIVITY 
could eat their cake and have it too. If SENSITIVITY is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for knowledge then we do have knowledge of mundane matters but lack 
knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses. It would then seem that 
SENSITIVITY gives the best of both worlds. 
But SENSITIVITY faced at least four devastating problems. First of all, since 
SENSITIVITY is able to accommodate our knowledge of mundane matters, and 
the intuition that we cannot know the denials of sceptical hypotheses, it is 
incompatible with the idea that knowledge is closed under known entailment. 
According to the epistemic closure principle, if S knows that p, and that p entails 
q, S knows that q.6 SENSITIVITY will violate this principle if we insert a 
mundane proposition in the place of p (such as I know that I have hands) and the 
denial of a sceptical hypothesis that is entailed by p (such as I am not a handless 
BIV) in place of q. My belief that I have hands is sensitive because in the nearest 
possible world where I do not have hands I do not believe that I have hands since 
they have been amputated long ago. My knowledge that I have hands entails that I 
                                                     
6 This is a very rough formulation of the closure principle. See Lasonen-Aarnio (2008, p. 157) for 
a more accurate rendering of the principle. 
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am not a handless BIV. However, my belief that I am not a BIV is not sensitive, 
since in the nearest possible world where I am a handless BIV I continue to 
believe that I am not. Therefore, SENSITIVITY violates epistemic closure 
principles. Nozick (1981, p. 198) himself embraced this feature of his view, 
though most epistemologists saw the violation of closure as an adequate reason 
for rejecting SENSITIVITY. 
Another problem that SENSITIVITY faced had to do with inductive knowledge. 
To use an example introduced by Sosa (1999b, pp. 145-146), suppose that you 
believe that the rubbish bag you just dropped down the garbage chute will soon be 
in the basement, on the basis of having confirmed multiple times in the past that 
objects that are dropped down the chute end up in the basement. Assuming that 
the chute is well maintained you ought to know that the bag will soon be in the 
basement. However, if the bag would not for some reason end up in the basement 
(an extremely rare event) you would still believe that it will soon be in the 
basement. Therefore your belief is insensitive even though it amounts to 
knowledge. 
Thirdly, it seems that if one knows that p then it ought to be possible for one to 
know that one does not falsely believe that p. However, the later proposition can 
never satisfy SENSITIVITY. After all, if it were false that one does not believe 
falsely that p, one would believe it anyway. If SENSITIVITY were a necessary 
condition for knowledge, then propositions like [I do not falsely believe that p] 
would be unknowable, but clearly they are not.7 
                                                     
7 Sosa (1999b, p. 145) makes this objection. See Vogel (2012, p. 139) for a lucid formalization of 
the argument. 
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Finally, SENSITIVITY can be applied only to cases in which the subject believes 
in a proposition, which is contingently true, if true at all, since the condition is 
vacuously satisfied if the subject believes in a necessarily true proposition.8 After 
all, if one believes that 12 x 13 = 156, one’s belief will trivially satisfy 
SENSITIVITY since there are no nearby possible worlds where it is false that 12 
x 13 =156. However, it is possible to believe in a necessarily true proposition 
without knowing it. Perhaps one used a malfunctioning calculator which by sheer 
chance happened to produce the correct answer as an output. 
After the problems with SENSITIVITY became apparent, some epistemologists 
proposed a new, rather similar, modal condition for knowledge, which came to be 
known as the safety condition.9 According to the safety condition a subject S’s 
true belief that p is safe if and only if S would believe that p only if it were so that 
p. Or more formally: B(p) ?→ p. The idea behind the safety condition is that in 
order to know something it must be the case that one could not easily have erred. 
The safety condition can be explicated with the help of a possible-worlds heuristic 
as follows: 
SAFETY: A subject S’s belief that p is safe if and only if, 
i) in nearby possible worlds where S believes that p, p is true. 
The crucial difference between SAFETY and SENSITIVITY is that they hold 
different possible worlds as relevant when determining whether the subject 
                                                     
8 Nozick recognized this problem and added another condition, which he called ‘adherence’, to his 
analysis of knowledge. A belief that p adheres to the truth just in case if p were true one would 
believe that p (Nozick, 1981, p. 179). 
9 The condition was first proposed by Luper-Foy (1984). The safety condition has also been 
proposed as a necessary condition for knowledge by Sainsbury (1997), Sosa (1999a, 1999b), 
Williamson (2000), Pritchard (2005, 2007, 2012a), Lasonen-Aarnio (2010), Gaultier (2014), 
Littlejohn (2014) and Greco (2012a, 2016) to name a few. 
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satisfies the condition. When determining whether a belief is safe, only the nearby 
possible worlds where the subject continues to believe what she believes in the 
actual world are relevant. SENSITIVITY, however, is not restricted to the space 
of nearby possible worlds. Rather, in order to evaluate whether a given belief is 
sensitive, we need to consider the nearest possible worlds where the proposition 
that the subject believes in the actual world is false. Depending on the modal 
nature of the belief that the subject formed in the actual world, the nearest 
possible worlds where what she believes is false could be a nearby or a faraway 
possible world. Thus, the fact that a subject could not track the truth of her belief 
to the possible worlds that lay at the outer rim of the possibility space could 
prohibit her from having knowledge. According to SAFETY, however, the 
faraway possible worlds are never relevant when determining whether a subject 
knows or not, though they might be relevant when determining whether the belief 
is true or not. For example, if the believed proposition contains a modal term, 
such as “it is possible that it is sunny tomorrow”, faraway possible worlds do 
count as relevant when determining whether the proposition is true. However, in 
order to evaluate whether the belief is safe, the belief has to match the truth only 
in the scope of the nearby possible worlds. 
Since SAFETY is restricted to the space of nearby possible worlds, it has 
welcome anti-sceptical qualities. Assuming that the actual world is roughly the 
way we think it is, the possible worlds where sceptical hypotheses obtain are 
faraway possible worlds.10 After all, a lot would have to have changed if it was 
                                                     
10 But why should this assumption be granted? After all, we do not know which world is the actual 
world. The reason why this assumption is legitimate is because our opponent is a global sceptic 
who claims that knowledge is impossible. The global sceptic must allow us to pick any 
metaphysically possible world as the actual world and show that even if the world was just like we 
thought it would be, we could not have any knowledge of it. The dialectic situation would be 
different if we attempted to show that we actually do have much knowledge. 
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the case that I am a BIV, given that at the moment it is not even possible to 
produce BIVs that have genuine experiences. Therefore, in all the nearby possible 
worlds where I believe that I am not a BIV my belief is true, and hence safe. 
Furthermore, it is easy to see that my mundane beliefs, such as I have hands, are 
safe, since in all the nearby possible worlds where I continue to believe that I have 
hands I do have hands. 
Moreover, SAFETY is compatible with epistemic closure principles.11 After all, if 
my beliefs that p and that p entails q are safe, then p must be true in nearby 
possible worlds where I believe that p, and q must also be true in those possible 
worlds since if my belief in p entails q is safe, p will entail q in nearby possible 
worlds where I believe that it does. Therefore, in nearby possible worlds where I 
believe safely that p, and that p entails q, my belief in q will also be safe. 
Like SENSITIVITY, SAFETY is able to deal with Gettier cases. Consider, for 
example, the stopped clock case. In most nearby possible worlds where S 
continues to believe that it is 12 o’clock her belief turns out to be false, since she 
looks at the clock a bit earlier or a bit later. Therefore S’s belief is not safe and 
does not qualify as knowledge. 
Finally, though both SENSITIVITY and SAFETY conditions have been advanced 
as conditions that seek to eliminate knowledge-destroying luck,12 only SAFETY 
                                                     
11 Even though it is generally accepted that SAFETY is compatible with epistemic closure 
principles, Cohen (2004) and Murphy (2005) have argued that SAFETY violates closure 
principles. The version of the safety condition that is put forward in Essays 1 and 2 is not 
susceptible to the kind of counterexample introduced by Cohen and Murphy. Lasonen-Aarnio 
(2008) has argued that ‘weak’ formulations of the safety condition violate multi-premise closure if 
the method of deduction is understood as a fallible method. I have argued (forthcoming) that weak 
formulations of the safety condition do not violate multi-premise closure once they are relativized 
to the method of belief formation that the subject uses in the actual world. 
12 Engel (1992) labels the knowledge-destroying luck “veritic luck”. 
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is motivated by a fully-fledged analysis of epistemic luck.13 In order to understand 
the ramifications of this point we need to consider what luck is and in what way it 
is incompatible with knowledge. 
The idea that knowledge is incompatible with a certain kind of luck was already 
noted by Plato in Theaetetus, where Socrates convinces Theaetetus that true belief 
is not sufficient for knowledge since the belief might be true as a matter of luck. 
In the wake of the Gettier debate, Peter Unger developed an account of knowledge 
in terms of luck (or accident as he called it). According to Unger (1968, p. 161), a 
subject knows that p if and only if it is not an accident that the subject believes the 
truth with respect to p. But clearly all luck is not epistemically harmful. For 
instance, many scientific discoveries were the result of an accident, yet we do not 
think any less of them on account of this. Unger noted this, and listed three 
different ways in which luck is compatible with knowledge. Very briefly the three 
varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession that Unger noted 
are the following: (i) you can witness an event which is itself an accident and yet 
know it (content luck); (ii) it can be a matter of luck that you are in possession of 
evidence that allows you to gain knowledge (evidential luck); (iii) it can be a 
matter of luck that you formed a belief in your predicament (doxastic luck). 
However, he left the notion of luck undefined and took it as a primitive concept.14 
As a consequence, almost no one accepted Unger’s analysis of knowledge, even 
though it might in fact have been counterexample free.  
                                                     
13 When discussing the early predecessor of the sensitivity condition, Dretske (1971, p. 18) notes 
that “I want to claim that any S satisfying conditions (A)-(C) is a person of whom it is true to say 
that it is not at all accidental that he is right about P’s being the case.” And here is Luper-Foy 
(1984, p. 34) when he first introduced what came to be known as the safety condition: “A belief 
that S has not inferred from another is nonaccidentally correct and thus noninferentially known if 
and only if a causal chain that meets certain reliability conditions joins it to an event or state of 
affairs that guarantees its truth. That is my analysis of noninferential knowledge in a nutshell.” 
14 Pritchard (2005, p. 141) lists Ravitch (1976), Foley (1984), Hall (1994), Heller (1999), Axtell 
(2001) and Vahid (2001) as philosophers who take luck as a primitive concept.  
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There are two reasons as to why epistemologists did not subscribe to Unger’s 
analysis. First, as Goldman (1976, p. 773)  notes, Unger’s analysis is hardly 
satisfying “for the notion of "non-accidentiality" itself needs explication”. 
Secondly, as is stressed by Nimtz (2013), given that one of the central goals of 
epistemology is to provide an answer to the question “what distinguishes 
knowledge from a luckily true belief?” an account that says “well, that it is not 
true as a matter of luck” seems unacceptable. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
epistemologists have tried to come up with detailed accounts of luck and 
conditions that seek to eliminate the harmful epistemic luck. 
There are currently two accounts of luck on the table that have notable support: 
the lack of control account and the modal account.15  Generally, the advocates of 
the lack of control account and the supporters of the modal account have agreed 
that only events that are significant to a subject can be treated as lucky or unlucky 
(Broncano-Berrocal, 2015; Coffman, 2007; Pritchard, 2005; Riggs, 2007), 
although Pritchard (2015) has in his most recent work rejected the necessity of a 
significance condition on lucky events. The distinction between good and bad 
luck is made in terms of positive and negative significance.  
On the lack of control account, an event is lucky for a subject if the occurrence of 
the event is beyond the subject’s control.16 The idea that we are lucky with respect 
to events that are beyond our control is very intuitive. A person who wins a fair 
lottery is extremely lucky to have won, but if we assume that she has rigged the 
                                                     
15 There are also ‘epistemic’ accounts of knowledge undermining luck that invoke epistemic 
notions other than belief on the consequent-side of the bi-condition. Given that the purpose of anti-
luck epistemology is to elucidate the nature of knowledge in terms of epistemically harmful luck, 
these accounts are less suitable for our purposes, even though they might be extensionally correct. 
For epistemic accounts of luck, see Steglich-Petersen (2010) and Goldberg (2015).  
16 A lack of control condition has been offered, at least as a necessary condition for luck, by Nagel 
(1979, p. 25), Statman (1991, p. 146), Zimmerman (1993, p. 231), Greco (1995, p. 83), Coffman 
(2007, p. 396), Riggs (2007, p. 339) and Broncano-Berrocal (2015, p. 21). 
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lottery so that she is in total control of which ticket will win her snatching the 
prize seems hardly a matter of luck. The idea that lucky events are beyond our 
control is also supported by the idea that responsibility and luck exclude each 
other. If a subject is not in control of her actions then she is not fully responsible 
for them either and cannot be blamed or praised for those actions. Given that we 
should not blame or praise agents who fail or succeed in their endeavours solely 
as a matter of luck, there would seem to be a tight connection between luck and 
lack of control. 
However, there is good reason to doubt that a lack of control condition could be a 
sufficient condition for an event occurring as a matter of luck. As Latus (2000, p. 
167) neatly puts it, the rising of the sun is beyond our control, yet we do not 
conclude that it was a matter of luck that the sun rose. Pritchard (2005, p. 127) 
points out that the lack of control condition is particularly problematic when it 
comes to epistemic luck, since most of our perceptual beliefs are not within our 
immediate control. It would be odd to conclude that these beliefs are therefore 
lucky. Finally, Lackey (2008, pp. 258-259) has argued that an event can be lucky 
for a subject even if the subject has direct control over the event. 
On the modal account of luck, developed by Duncan Pritchard, an event is lucky 
if it obtains in the actual world but fails to obtain in most nearby possible worlds 
where the relevant initial conditions for the event remain the same (2005, p. 128). 
The modal account treats a fair lottery win as a lucky event since it occurs in the 
actual world, but fails to occur in most nearby possible worlds where the relevant 
initial conditions for the event stay the same (namely the lottery is fair). After all, 
the number of possible worlds where one’s lottery ticket is a loser far outnumbers 
the possible worlds where the ticket is a winner. The modal account also respects 
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the intuition that it is not a matter of luck that one won the lottery if one has 
rigged the game. Presumably, if one has rigged the lottery one will win, not just in 
the actual world, but also in most nearby possible worlds where one remains in 
control of which ticket wins. Unlike the lack of control account, however, the 
modal account does accommodate the intuition that it is not at all a matter of luck 
that the sun rose this morning, since the sun continues to rise in all nearby 
possible worlds. 
The modal account of luck is consistent with empirical evidence regarding how 
people conceive lucky events. Psychologist Karl Teigen (1995, 1996, 1997, 
1998a, 1998b, 2003) found out that success was perceived as more lucky if the 
possible failure was physically close rather than faraway (for example, when a 
wheel of fortune stopped in the winning sector which was physically close to a 
losing sector). Interestingly, Teigen found out that the perceived luck could not be 
understood solely in terms of the probabilities involved, since subjects would 
perceive that a ball which landed in a losing sector which was physically near a 
winning sector involved more bad luck than if the ball landed on a losing sector 
which was not near a winning sector, all the while recognizing that the chance of a 
ball landing in a losing sector was constant on each spin of the wheel. Since 
physical closeness on a roulette wheel is basically modal closeness, Teigen’s 
results support the modal account of luck. 
But even though the modal account of luck offered by Pritchard is able to 
accommodate our intuitions regarding different cases and is supported by 
empirical evidence there are dissenters. Lackey (2008, p. 261) has provided a 
counterexample where a subject is planting a rosebush in location X (and could 
not have planted it anywhere else) and finds a buried treasure which could not 
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have been buried anywhere else than in location X. Intuitively, the subject is 
lucky to have found the buried treasure. After all, she did not know anything 
about the treasure. However, given how the case is constructed, the subject will 
find the treasure in all nearby possible worlds where she goes to plant the 
rosebush, and therefore her finding the treasure is not a lucky event according to 
the modal account of luck.17 
In Essay 1 I argue that the modal account of luck as stated by Pritchard rules 
certain non-lucky events as lucky. I argue that we must amend the modal account 
so that we do not restrict our attention solely to the modal profile of the event that 
occurred in the actual world when evaluating whether the event occurred as a 
matter of luck. Rather, we need to look at the modal profile of other events as well 
that are similar in nature and equal in significance to the subject. The reformulated 
version of the modal account of luck supports a novel reformulation of the safety 
condition. Even though the modal account of luck does suffer from some 
problems I do still consider that it is approximately correct. The modal account of 
luck is largely assumed in essays 1-3, although the results do not depend on the 
account being true. Rather, the modal account of luck motivates some of the 
claims that are made in the essays. 
Now that we have the modal account of luck before us it should be easy to see 
why SAFETY is a more promising anti-luck condition that SENSITIVITY. After 
all, on the modal account of luck a belief is true as a matter of luck just in case it 
is true in the actual world and false in most nearby possible worlds. A belief is 
safe just in case it is true in nearby possible worlds where it is believed. Hence a 
                                                     
17 Carter (2010, pp. 530-531) and Pritchard (2015, p. 159) defend the modal account against 
Lackey’s argument. 
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belief that is safe cannot be true as a matter of luck if the modal account of luck is 
the correct account. Can a belief that is sensitive be true as a matter of luck? Yes, 
it can. Recall that a subject’s belief that p is sensitive just in case in the nearest 
possible worlds where p is false the subject does not believe that p. Since it is 
possible that a subject will refrain from believing that p in the scope of the very 
closest possible worlds where p is false and believe it falsely in possible worlds 
that are a bit further away, but still nearby, a sensitive belief can be true in the 
actual world but false in most nearby possible worlds. Therefore, while both 
SENSITIVITY and SAFETY have been designed to rule out the kind of luck that 
is incompatible with knowledge, only SAFETY is backed by a theory of what 
luck is.18 
Nevertheless, even SAFETY is under threat. Like SENSITIVITY, SAFETY is 
trivially satisfied if the subject believes in a necessarily true proposition. The 
reason for this is that a necessary truth is true in all possible worlds and hence it is 
true in all possible worlds where it is believed. However, as noted above, not all 
beliefs in necessary truths amount to knowledge. In Essay 1 I argue that in order 
to deal with cases featuring necessary truths the safety condition must be 
globalized to a set of propositions in which the subject could easily have 
believed.19 To be truly safe from error it is not enough that the belief that the 
subject formed in the actual world could not easily have been false. Rather, the 
                                                     
18 Several virtue epistemologists have argued that the satisfaction of SAFETY (or a condition in its 
vicinity) is entailed by the satisfaction of a virtue-theoretic condition (Carter, 2016; Gaultier, 2014; 
Greco, 2010, 2016; Littlejohn, 2014; Sosa, 2015). If this were true then, given the independent 
plausibility of virtue epistemological theories of knowledge, we would have yet another reason to 
prefer SAFETY over SENSITIVITY. Sadly this advantage seems to be illusory. I have argued 
(forthcoming) that the arguments that virtue epistemologists have laid down for the idea that virtue 
entails safety do not entail the kind of safety condition that we have in mind, when we require a 
belief to be safe from error in order to be knowledge. 
19 Globalized versions of the safety condition have been put forward by Williamson (2009b) and 
Pritchard (2012a). In Essay 1 I compare my formulation with Williamson’s and Pritchard’s 
formulations. 
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subject must be safe as an epistemic agent and this means that she must be safe 
from forming false beliefs in her inquiry. This point about safety can be made 
outside the epistemic domain as well. The fact that I am safe from being shot by 
Smith does not mean that I am safe from being shot period. In order to be truly 
safe from being shot I must be safe, not just with respect to Smith, but with 
respect to other potential shooters as well. My proposal is that in order to be 
properly safe one must be safe from error in one’s inquiry. In order to know it has 
to be the case that one could not easily have ended up believing in a possible false 
answer to a question that the proposition one believes in the actual world is an 
answer to.   
Besides being able to deal with cases featuring necessary truths, the globalized 
version of the safety principle can be applied to the problem of peer disagreement 
in ways in which the original safety principle could not. The main question in the 
epistemology of disagreement is what kind of epistemic power disagreement has. 
This question is usually framed in terms of reasonableness and rationality. Hence 
the central questions have been can there be reasonable disagreements between 
epistemic peers, and what ought one do in the face of peer disagreement. In Essay 
2 I approach the epistemology of disagreement from a novel angle by considering 
what kind of epistemic power disagreement has over knowledge, assuming that 
the safety condition is a necessary condition for knowledge and that knowledge is 
the norm of belief. The assumption that safety is a necessary condition for 
knowledge motivates a modal account of epistemic peerhood. 
On the modal account of epistemic peerhood, two subjects are epistemic peers 
regarding a subject matter only if they have roughly the same number of true and 
false beliefs regarding propositions that belong to that subject matter across 
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nearby possible worlds in a similar distribution. There are currently two other 
accounts of epistemic peerhood in the literature. On the evidential and cognitive 
equality account two subjects are epistemic peers relative to the question whether 
p if and only if they have the same body of evidence that is relevant to the 
question whether p and they are equally competent and reliable in assessing that 
evidence.20 A competing account has been proposed by Elga (2007, p. 481) 
according to which two subjects are epistemic peers on the question whether p if 
and only if, conditional on their disagreement they are both equally likely to be 
mistaken. I have no argument against these accounts of epistemic peerhood. 
Rather, I merely think that the modal account of epistemic peerhood is much 
easier to operate on if the safety condition is a necessary condition for knowledge. 
Interestingly, it turns out that two subjects who disagree, and really are epistemic 
peers, cannot satisfy the globalized safety condition if the modal account of 
epistemic peerhood is correct. After all, given that the subjects acquire roughly the 
same number of true and false beliefs in nearby possible worlds, and one of them 
believes falsely in the actual world, it applies to both disagreeing parties that they 
could easily have believed something that is false. Therefore, even if you are in 
the right and I am in the wrong neither of us has knowledge, since you could 
easily have believed what I believe. 
Crucially, however, the modal approach to disagreement yields different results in 
cases of apparent peer disagreement. In such cases the disagreeing parties merely 
take each other to be epistemic peers, whereas in reality they are not. In such cases 
the subject who was in the right might satisfy the globalized safety condition and 
                                                     
20 Proponents of the evidential and cognitive equality account include Kelly (2005, pp. 174-175), 
Christensen (2007, pp. 188-189), Feldman (2007, p. 201), Lackey (2010, p. 302) and 
Lammenranta (2011, p. 5) among others. 
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thus might have knowledge. In Essay 2 I argue that the modal approach to 
disagreement offers a fruitful middle-ground between the conformists and non-
conformists, and is actually supported by both conformist and nonconformist 
intuitions. 
The conformism versus nonconformism debate is one of the central disputes 
within the epistemology of disagreement. The conformists claim that we should 
give equal weight to our own beliefs and to those held by our peers. They think 
that in cases of peer disagreement significant doxastic revision is called for.21 
Nonconformism is much more popular nowadays. According to nonconformism, 
the mere fact that you disagree with your epistemic peer does not mandate any 
revision on either side of the disagreement.22 In Essay 2 I argue that conformists 
have focused on cases of real peer disagreement and that their view delivers the 
correct verdict regarding such cases, while nonconformists have focused on cases 
of apparent peer disagreement and that their view delivers the correct verdict 
regarding such cases. The modal approach to disagreement explains what is 
correct in conformism and nonconformism and what is wrong in both positions. 
However, even though the globalized version of the safety condition has several 
advantages over its simpler versions, it inherits some severe problems from its 
predecessors. Perhaps the most pressing problem for the safety condition is the so-
called generality problem. In order to get to grips with the generality problem we 
                                                     
21 Christensen (2007), Elga (2007), Feldman (2007) and Littlejohn (2013) have defended the 
conformist position. Lasonen-Aarnio (2013) has argued that no version of conformism is correct 
since they ignore what she calls evidential attenuation and evidential amplification. Evidential 
attenuation can shield the subject from defeating evidence in such a way that she should not give 
equal weight to the opinion of a peer, while evidential amplification makes a subject more 
susceptible to defeaters and thus forces her to give greater weight to the opinion of her peer. In 
neither case should the disagreeing parties give equal weight to the opinion of their peers (2013, p. 
783). 
22 Nonconformism has been defended by Kelly (2005, 2010), Wedgwood (2010) and Sosa (2010) 
and among others. 
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need to realize that SAFETY as currently formulated is susceptible to certain 
counterexamples that can be sidestepped if SAFETY is relativized to the method 
of belief formation that the subject uses in the actual world. This weakness is 
shared by SENSITIVITY. Nozick (1981, p. 191) himself already noted that modal 
conditions for knowledge need to be relativized to the method of belief formation. 
For example, suppose that a grandmother sees her grandchild who is in good 
health and forms the justified true belief that the child is healthy. But, if the child 
had been sick (which could easily have been the case given a recent outbreak of a 
virus in the kindergarten) the child’s parents would not have allowed the 
grandmother to visit and would have lied to her that the child is in good health in 
order not to upset her. Intuitively, the grandmother knows that the child is in good 
health when she sees the child, even though the child’s parents would have 
deceived her if the child had been sick. Given how the case is set up, the 
grandmother’s belief does not satisfy SAFETY or SENSITIVITY. After all, there 
is a nearby possible world where the grandmother believes that the child is in 
good health while she is sick and in the nearest possible worlds where the child is 
sick the grandmother will continue to believe that the child is in good health. 
Crucially, if SAFETY and SENSITIVITY are relativized to the method of belief 
formation that the subject uses in the actual world, the grandmother will satisfy 
both conditions. There are no nearby possible worlds where the grandmother ends 
up believing falsely that the child is in good health by seeing the child. Therefore, 
the method of belief formation that the subject uses in the actual world must be 
kept constant in all relevant possible worlds when evaluating whether the belief is 
safe or sensitive. 
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But the method relativization of the conditions raises a new problem: how should 
we determine the method of belief formation that the subject used in the actual 
world to form her belief? Given that all (non-innate) beliefs are tokens of a certain 
cognitive process or method, and that each token can be labelled under multiple 
different types of methods, it is paramount to explicate how the token processes 
are to be typed. The extension of safe and sensitive beliefs will vary greatly 
depending on how the tokens are typed. This is essentially the generality problem 
for process reliabilism.23  
Following Conee and Feldman (1998, p. 3), epistemologists have thought that in 
order to solve the generality problem the reliabilist has to provide a formula that 
picks out a unique process type in each case. Reliabilists have tried to meet this 
demand by trying to offer necessary and sufficient conditions for when two token 
processes can be treated as belonging under the same type.24 I believe that this 
strategy of answering the generality problem is misguided. In Essay 1 I offer a 
solution to the generality problem that becomes available once we recognize that 
if our aim is to provide an account of what knowledge is, it is enough to be able to 
tell when two knowledge-conducive processes belong under the same type. I 
argue that it is much easier to answer this question. 
In order to avoid obvious circularity in the analysis of knowledge I offer an 
account of knowledge-conducive methods of belief formation that is motivated by 
virtue epistemological considerations. I argue that only virtuous methods of belief 
formation can produce knowledge and that therefore it is harmless to restrict our 
                                                     
23 The fact that reliabilist analyses of knowledge are susceptible to the generality problem was first 
noted by Goldman (1979) and has later been pursued  notably by Conee and Feldman (1998).   
24 See, for example, Alston (1995), Beebe (2004) Broncano-Berrocal (2014) and Miracchi (2017). 
Comesana (2006) and Bishop (2010) have argued that the generality problem is a problem for 
everyone, not just those who advocate reliabilism of one form or another. 
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attention to virtuously formed beliefs when evaluating whether a given belief 
satisfies the safety condition. Epistemic virtues are stable dispositions seated in 
the agent to attain true beliefs and avoid false regarding a certain field of 
propositions while in certain conditions (Sosa, 1991, p. 284). Very roughly, in the 
case of the virtue of good eyesight the physical basis of the disposition would 
consist in the rods and cones and the visual cortex, the field of propositions would 
consist of propositions in which the virtue could produce beliefs in ([that is red], 
[that is round]) and the conditions would be adequate lighting conditions, medium 
distance etc. In Essay 1 show that by relativizing the safety condition to virtuous 
methods of belief formation that the subject uses in the actual world the safety 
theorist is able to provide a promising solution to the generality problem.25 
This version of the safety condition motivates a ‘minimal’ virtue epistemological 
theory of knowledge that is committed to the idea that epistemic virtues are 
necessary for knowledge. It rejects, however, the idea that in all cases of 
knowledge, one’s cognitive success, i.e. the acquisition of a true belief, is 
attributable to one’s cognitive virtues.26 In Essay 3 I argue against virtue 
epistemological theories of knowledge that are committed to the latter of these 
                                                     
25 While the idea that knowledge is always gained through virtuous methods of belief formation is 
widely accepted Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) has argued that knowledge can be gained even through 
bad epistemic strategies. However, even on her view the method via which the belief was gained 
has to be reliable in the particular circumstances in which it was used if the belief is to constitute 
knowledge. While the view advocated by Lasonen-Aarnio is in tension with the view presented 
here, I believe there is a way to reconcile them, since the fact that one formed a belief through a 
virtuous method of belief formation does not obviously entail that one must be “managing one’s 
beliefs through the adaption of policies that are generally knowledge conducive” (Lasonen-Aarnio, 
2010, p. 2). Exercising a virtuous method of belief formation need not entail that one is thereby 
disposed as an epistemic agent to manage one’s belief-forming processes in a way that is 
knowledge-conducive. While the position advocated by Lasonen-Aarnio might be compatible with 
the one pursued here, I would rather go in the opposite direction and argue that knowledge cannot 
be acquired by subjects who are not epistemically virtuous. This move would allow the proponent 
of the safety condition to accommodate our intuitions in defeat cases, without resorting to an error 
theory, like Lasonen-Aarnio does. 
26 Virtue epistemological theories of knowledge that conceive knowledge as a cognitive success 
that is creditable to the subject’s cognitive abilities have been put forward by Sosa (1980, 1991, 
2007, 2009, 2011, 2015), Zagzebski (1996), Riggs (2002), Greco (2003, 2010, 2012b) Turri 
(2011) Jarvis (2013), Gaultier (2014), Littlejohn (2014) and Carter (2016), among others. 
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ideas. I argue that several high-profile virtue epistemologists are committed to the 
idea that one’s cognitive success is attributable to one’s cognitive virtues just in 
case the fact that one formed one’s belief through the exercise of one’s cognitive 
virtues enhances the safety of one’s belief. Call this the contribution thesis. I 
demonstrate that if the contribution thesis was true, virtue epistemologists would 
be able to deal with some of the most pressing arguments against virtue 
epistemological theories of knowledge. Namely, they would be able deal with 
both cases featuring environmental epistemic luck and with cases of testimonial 
knowledge and accommodate the epistemic dependency thesis.27 However, I also 
show that virtue epistemological theories of knowledge that are committed to the 
contribution thesis are ultimately untenable, since there are clear cases of 
knowledge where one’s cognitive virtues do not enhance the safety of one’s 
belief. 
While the generality problem and the problem concerning necessary truths do not 
undermine the idea that safety is necessary for knowledge, several authors have 
provided arguments that seek to establish that conclusion. Even though I do not 
argue for the claim that a safety condition is necessary for knowledge in the 
essays that this dissertation is comprised of, the conclusions that one would be 
able to draw from this dissertation would be more interesting if safety was 
necessary for knowledge. Since I do not engage with the arguments that purport to 
                                                     
27 Lackey (2007, 2009) has argued that virtue epistemological accounts of knowledge cannot 
accommodate cases of testimonial knowledge while delivering the verdict of ignorance in cases 
featuring environmental luck. Pritchard (2010, 2012a) has argued for the same conclusion with 
respect to robust virtue epistemological theories of knowledge that contain only virtue-theoretic 
conditions, but he maintains that weaker virtue epistemological theories can accommodate both 
cases. Kallestrup and Pritchard (2013) have argued that robust virtue epistemological theories of 
knowledge cannot accommodate the idea that knowledge can be dependent on factors that are 
completely external to one’s cognitive agency and therefore is unable to deliver correct verdicts 
regarding certain cases. 
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show that safety is not necessary for knowledge in the essays, it is proper to take a 
stance on them here. 
The arguments that have been presented against the necessity of the safety 
condition rely on the counterexample method. Neta and Rohrbaugh (2004), 
Comesana (2005), Baumann (2008) Kelp (2009) and Bogardus (2014) have 
provided thought experiments where the subject’s belief does not seem to satisfy 
the safety condition and yet the subject’s belief seems to be knowledge. ‘Seems’ 
is the right choice of word here since many epistemologists have challenged the 
idea that the thought experiments feature either a safe belief or knowledge. For 
example, Bogardus (2014) has argued that in the putative counterexamples put 
forth by Neta and Rohrbaugh, Comesaña, Bauman and Kelp, the subject actually 
satisfies the safety condition and therefore they are not counterexamples to the 
necessity of the safety condition. Broncano-Berrocal (2014) and Pritchard (2016, 
p. 9) have argued that the counterexample that Bogardus presents suffers from the 
same defect. Williamson (2009a) has also argued that the safety condition is 
satisfied in the case offered by Neta and Rohrbaugh. Goldman (2009, pp. 79-80) 
notes that the case presented by Neta and Rohrbaugh is analogous to the famous 
barn façade case and therefore seems to be a case of ignorance rather than a case 
of knowledge. Pritchard (2012b, pp. 181-183) argues that the cases presented by 
Neta and Rohrbaugh and Kelp are not cases of knowledge and provides an 
explanation why they might seem to be cases of knowledge. 
In short, to say that there is no consensus regarding whether there are genuine 
counterexamples against the necessity of the safety condition is a gross 
understatement. Rather than going through immensely complicated intuition 
mongering, I will here just state some structural features that are shared by the 
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cases offered by Neta and Rohrbaugh, Comsaña, Bauman and Bogardus and refer 
to Luper who has argued that such cases are best conceived as borderline case of 
knowledge. For brevity’s sake I will here present only the case offered by Neta 
and Rohrbaugh, which goes as follows: S is drinking a glass of water which she 
has just poured from the bottle. Standing next to S is a happy person who has just 
won the lottery. Had this person lost the lottery, she would have polluted the water 
with a colourless, odorless, tasteless toxin, but since she won the lottery she does 
nothing of the sort (2004, pp. 399-400). 
According to Neta and Rohrbaugh, S knows that she is drinking water in the case, 
even though her belief is unsafe. After all, there are many nearby possible worlds 
where she believes that she is drinking water while her belief is false, since her 
‘friend’ has poisoned the water.  
Luper (2006) argues that the above case features ‘restorative rigging’ and that it 
therefore differs in important respects from clear-cut cases of ignorance that 
feature only ‘deleterious rigging’. Classic Gettier cases, such as the clock case, 
feature deleterious rigging. In such cases, the subject is using a method of belief 
formation that is normally reliable, but which happens to be unreliable in the 
peculiar circumstances in which the subject finds herself in. In essence, the 
reliability of the method is undermined by introducing further details to the case, 
in the clock case by telling that the clock has stopped. Cases like the one offered 
by Neta and Rohrbaugh differ from Gettier cases in that after introducing details 
that rig the case deleteriously the reliability of the method of belief formation is 
restored by some further added details (in the above case by telling that the person 
won the lottery). Figuratively speaking, the deleterious rigging ‘pulls’ the worlds 
in which S is deceived closer than they would have been if there had not been a 
28 
 
person with malicious intentions next to S, while the restorative rigging ‘pushes’ 
them back out. Depending on how the details of the case are spelled out the 
deceit-worlds might be pushed far enough for the safety condition to be satisfied 
(Luper, 2006, p. 164). Luper argues that cases that feature restorative rigging are 
best conceived as borderline cases of knowledge. This conclusion is further 
strengthened by the fact that several epistemologists have suggested that cases 
featuring restorative rigging are in fact cases of ignorance, and drawn the 
conclusion that the safety condition is not sufficient for knowledge.28 Given that 
epistemologists have diverging intuitions regarding these structurally similar 
cases, the fact that the safety condition rules such cases as borderline cases of 
knowledge should be seen as a virtue of the safety condition. The inherent 
vagueness of the safety condition is unproblematic if it corresponds to the 
vagueness we find in our knowledge attributions, and this seems to be the case 
(Williamson, 2000, p. 100). 
This does not mean that we should blindly accept the safety condition as a 
necessary or sufficient condition for knowledge. Hand-waving arguments for one 
side or the other should not be used to determine whether safety is necessary for 
knowledge. On the contrary, there are genuine doubts as to whether the 
satisfaction of the safety condition is necessary for knowledge possession. But 
even though we might rightfully doubt whether safety is necessary for knowledge, 
we should recognize that having epistemically safe beliefs is of great value. We 
need to minimize the risk of false belief if we are to succeed in our practical 
endeavours. This thesis argues only indirectly for the necessity of the safety 
condition. It does so by highlighting how the concept of epistemic safety can be 
                                                     
28 See Miracchi (2015, p. 40) and Shope (2002, p. 37). 
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put to use in different epistemological debates with interesting and plausible 
results. One might say that I have put the carriage before the horse, but sometimes 
you should do this, if only to see what comes of it. All in all, I consider that there 
are better reasons to think that safety is necessary for knowledge than to think that 
it is not. However, if it turned out that safety is not necessary for knowledge this 
thesis would not be undermined. Epistemic safety is in itself a philosophically and 
practically important phenomenon, and unearthing what it is, how it is related to 
epistemic virtues and whether we can believe safely in the face of peer 
disagreements are philosophical discoveries of value. 
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